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Abstract
Official and four alternative regime classification schemes based on observed exchange
rate behaviour are used to examine the relationship with inflation and growth in
developing countries.  For an identical sample of observations from 73 countries for
1984-2001, only the scheme based on parallel rates suggests a significant effect
(negative) of floating on growth.  Floats that claim to be pegs, or have high exchange
rate volatility, are the ones with lower growth.   Hard pegs offer inflation benefits.
Floating is not consistently associated with higher inflation than soft pegs, and any
apparent association is a possible by-product of the design of the classification
algorithms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For countries with weak monetary institutions, it is an important issue whether an
external nominal anchor can provide price stability, and whether it can do so without
sacrificing growth.  The Asian crisis focused observers’ attention on the fact that
exchange rate regimes in developing countries are not always quite what they are claimed
to be.  This realisation stimulated the development of classification schemes other than
those reported by the IMF which, up until then, had been self-declarations by countries’
authorities.  This proliferation of classification schemes has made it harder to reach a
definitive answer to the question of the relationship between the exchange rate regime
and macroeconomic outcomes, such as inflation and growth.  In this paper, we try to
simplify the issue by estimating the relationships on a sample that is identical across
classification schemes.
Four such “de facto” schemes are those of Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002), Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2005), Shambaugh (2004) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  Bubula
and Ötker-Robe (2002) [hereafter BOR] backdate the IMF practice begun in 1999 of
checking the self-declared exchange rate regime against other statistical and documentary
evidence about the official exchange rate. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) [LYS]
use a purely statistical methodology, based on the behaviour of the official exchange rate
and international reserves, floats (pegs) being associated with high (low) exchange rate
volatility and low (high) reserve volatility.  Shambaugh (2004) aims only to differentiate
pegs from other regimes, and defines a peg as having at most one devaluation within a
calendar year.  Finally, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) [RR] use a classification
methodology based essentially on the statistical behaviour of the parallel rather than the
official exchange rate, where such a rate exists.
The correlation between these classification systems, beyond the obvious cases, is
surprisingly low, and not just because behaviour differs from official claims.  Alternative
de facto classification systems produce disconcertingly different results.  Here we focus
on what difference this makes to the empirical relationship between exchange rate2
regimes and macroeconomic outcomes (inflation and growth) in developing countries.
Developing countries are more likely than advanced countries to have weak monetary
institutions and therefore to rely on an exchange rate peg for monetary credibility.  Such a
policy is considerably less attractive if there is a growth penalty attached.  The evidence
from previous research on this subject is conflicting, in part because previous authors
have used different samples, different methodology, and at most one alternative
classification scheme.  We show here that, if we compare IMF and the three alternative
classification schemes that go back before 1990 on a common data set, at least some of
these differences are resolved.  We focus exclusively on the statistical association
between macroeconomic outcomes and exchange rate regimes, and we do not attempt to
identify causality.  This is partly because the persistence of regimes makes causality
issues difficult to resolve, and partly because causality only becomes an issue once a
statistical association has been established.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly summarise the evidence on the performance of exchange rate
regimes in developing countries, without going into details of the classification schemes,
which we discuss in the next section.
Ghosh et al. (2002) use a large data set of 147 countries over a thirty-year period (1970-
99).  They find that, according to official IMF classifications, pegs are associated with
significantly lower inflation than intermediate regimes (such as crawling pegs or tightly
managed floats) or floats, except in the advanced countries.  With a finer classification of
regimes (their Table 6.3), they find that hard pegs have the lowest inflation, but that other
pegs still have lower inflation than more flexible regimes.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, Table 15), using their own classification, find that
in non-industrial countries hard pegs have lower inflation than other regimes, as do soft
pegs which last for at least five years, but that otherwise there is little difference in
inflation rates across exchange rate regimes in a 1974-99 data set.  Bleaney and Francisco
(2005) report that, once inflation persistence or fixed country effects are taken into3
account, there is no difference in inflation rates between soft pegs and floats, using either
the IMF or the BOR classification, over the period 1985-2000.  They also find that hard
pegs are associated with significantly lower inflation.  Husain et al. (2005, Table 9),
using the RR classification for 1970-99, conclude that in developing countries (other than
emerging markets), exchange rate flexibility is associated with significantly higher
inflation, but it is unclear if this finding is robust to the separation of hard and soft pegs.
To summarise: the lowest inflation rates amongst developing countries are associated
with hard pegs.  Whether other types of pegs have lower inflation rates than floats is still
a matter of some debate.
With respect to per capita growth, most authors (Bleaney and Francisco, 2005; Ghosh et
al., 2002; Husain et al. 2005) find no robust association between exchange rate regimes
and growth.  An important exception is Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, 2003), who
claim that floats are associated with significantly higher growth in non-industrial
countries, by about one percentage point per annum.
These differences in results provide the motivation for our investigation of the
regime/performance relationship with different classification schemes but an identical
sample.  With an identical sample, variations in results across classification schemes can
be reliably attributed to different classification methods rather than to differences in the
sample.
3. CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
This section gives a brief explanation of the classification schemes, and presents some
statistical comparisons.  Even using official classifications, there are important
aggregation and other issues.  For instance, how wide does an exchange rate band have to
be before it is classified as a float?  For the official classification, we treat managed floats
and free floats as flexible regimes, and everything else as a form of peg.  Many other
authors (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2002) have an intermediate category that includes regimes such
as crawling pegs.  We do not distinguish such an intermediate category because crawling4
pegs are clearly designed to achieve one of the main functions of a peg – real exchange
rate stability.  Since pegs only crawl as a result of inflation, to treat a crawling peg as
something other than a peg would bias the results towards a finding of lower inflation for
pegs.
Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) backdate the post-1999 IMF practice of checking the
announced regime against other official documents and exchange rate behaviour.  A
regime is only defined as a peg if there is documentary evidence of a policy of pegging,
as well as exchange rate stability.
1  Thus their procedure for identifying de facto regimes
is not purely statistical.  Where multiple exchange rates exist, they use the one
characterised by the most transactions.  Unfortunately their classification is not available
before 1990.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) use cluster analysis to identify a country during
each calendar year as having either a pegged regime, a crawling peg, a dirty float or a
flexible regime, based on three variables: the volatility of the nominal exchange rate level
against the identified anchor currency (average absolute monthly percentage change), the
volatility of exchange rate changes (standard deviation of monthly percentage changes),
and the volatility of foreign exchange reserves (average absolute monthly percentage
change in net dollar international reserves relative to the dollar value of the monetary
base in the previous month), which is a measure of exchange rate intervention.  The last
variable is mainly used to distinguish between “clean” and “dirty” floats rather than
between floats and other regimes.  A feature of this scheme is that sizeable devaluations
within a calendar year will cause that year to be classified as something other than a peg
even if the exchange rate is pegged immediately before and after the devaluation, because
of their impact on the exchange rate volatility measures.
Shambaugh (2004) uses a relatively strict definition of pegs, since his interest is in the
extent to which nominal interest rates follow those in the anchor currency.  The nominal
                                                          
1 They write (p. 11): “[w]hen available information indicated that the authorities targeted to keep the
exchange rate stable and the exchange rate remained within a range less than 2 per cent for at least four
months vis-à-vis a given currency, the regime was classified de facto as a conventional fixed peg.”5
exchange rate must remain within a two per cent band within the year, or have zero
movement for eleven out of twelve months.  If neither criterion is met, the regime is a
non-peg.  Like LYS, his scheme generates annual classifications only.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) differ from the others principally in focusing on parallel
rather than official exchange rates.  Their statistical approach is based purely on exchange
rate movements, on the grounds that reserve movements are an unreliable measure of
exchange market intervention.  They allow regimes to be categorised as a peg or a band
even if a significant minority of exchange rate movements is large.  A country which
experiences a zero exchange rate change over four months, or for which no more than 80
per cent of the monthly absolute exchange rate changes over five years exceed one per
cent, is classified as pegging.  If this criterion is not met, but no more than 80 per cent of
the monthly absolute exchange rate changes over five years exceed five per cent, the
episode is classified as a form of band.
2  Episodes that fail both tests are classified as
floats.  Within this category, RR separate out observations with twelve-month inflation
greater than 40 per cent into a “freely falling” category.  In our analysis we also shall
omit these observations, which are characterised by particularly low growth.
Theory suggests that adjustment to macroeconomic shocks poses very different problems
if exchange rate flexibility is removed.  Yet many pegs permit adjustment of the parity,
and in practice such adjustments are frequent.  It is therefore important to distinguish
pegs that retain the devaluation option (soft pegs) from those that do not, or at least which
make it very difficult (hard pegs).  We define hard pegs as currency board systems and
the absence of a separate legal tender.  Currency boards incorporate rules preventing
sterilisation of reserve losses, and the parity is frequently backed by legal commitments.
Lack of a separate legal tender means that devaluation cannot be a unilateral decision (as
in the case of currency unions such as the CFA zone) or is effectively impossible (where
                                                          
2 The 80 per cent criterion is designed to avoid classifying infrequent devaluation episodes as floats, and
perhaps also to ensure that not every case of a parallel exchange rate is classified as a float.  It does mean,
however, that floats that are characterised by low exchange rate volatility, perhaps because their trade is
dominated by a large neighbouring country, as in the case of Canada or Switzerland, end up being classified
as non-floats.6
the country has adopted the currency of a much bigger country, commonly referred to as
dollarisation).
3  We define hard pegs in the same way across all classification schemes, so
the differences across schemes relate to the distinction between soft pegs and floats.
For each classification scheme, we separate the observations that are not hard pegs and
not “freely falling” into soft pegs and floats.  Floats are those that are described as free,
managed or dirty floats.  Other regimes that are sometimes lumped into an intermediate
category, such as crawling pegs or bands, we label as a form of soft peg.  The one
exception to this is the JS classification, which uses a relatively narrow definition of a
peg, and categorises everything else as a non-peg.
4. THE DATA
We use annual data for all developing countries other than transition countries from 1984
to 2001.  We exclude transition countries to avoid possible distortion of results by the
abnormal experience of transition.  Since the BOR classification covers only the 1990-
2000 period, we use a different sample for that classification, and a common sample for
the other four exchange rate regimes.  After excluding observations with inflation above
40 per cent p.a., the common sample comprises 898 observations from 73 countries for
inflation, and 877 observations from 73 countries for per capita growth.  Macroeconomic
outcomes for a calendar year are compared with the exchange rate regime in place at 31
December of the previous year (or the classification for the whole of the previous year in
the case of LYS and JS).
It is instructive to analyse the 617 observations that are common to each classification
and which are not hard pegs or inflationary crises.  As Table 1 shows, the proportion of
these observations classified as floats rather than soft pegs is 41.1 per cent for the IMF
classification, 71.0 per cent for the JS classification, 45.7 per cent for the LYS
classification, 28.2 per cent for the RR classification and 49.9 per cent for the BOR
classification.  Thus alternative classifications vary considerably in the proportion of
floats identified.  These differences primarily reflect the stringency of the definition of a
                                                          
3 This definition of hard pegs is standard (e.g. Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2002).7
peg, rather than the choice between official and parallel rates or the time span used in the
analysis.
Perhaps more surprising are the rather low correlations between the classifications in
relation to the identification of floating regimes as opposed to soft pegs, with the
exception of the IMF/BOR pair (see Table 1).  The correlation between the IMF and
BOR classifications is 0.64, but de facto schemes agree even less with each other than
with the de jure classification.  The average correlation with other classifications is 0.36
for IMF, and varies from 0.40 (BOR) down to 0.16 (RR) for the alternative
classifications.  What this indicates is that purely statistical methods of identifying
exchange rate regimes produce markedly different results not only from other
approaches, but also from each other.  Perhaps most notable is the fact that the RR
classification, based on parallel rates, is something of an outlier.
Table 1.  Correlations between Classification Schemes
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
IMF JS LYS RR BOR Proportion
of floats
IMF 1 0.411
JS 0.37 1 0.710
LYS 0.28 0.38 1 0.457
RR 0.15 0.08 0.05 1 0.282
BOR 0.64 0.38 0.24 0.35 1 0.494
Mean 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.16 0.40
Notes.  The correlations refer to a common sample of 617 observations excluding hard
pegs and inflationary crises, except in the case of the BOR classification which is
unavailable before 1990.  For the BOR classification the sample is 413 observations.8
5. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND INFLATION
We are now ready to examine the relationship between exchange rate regimes and
macroeconomic performance.  In this section we investigate whether the annual inflation
rate varies with the exchange rate regime at 31 December of the previous year, using a
sample of observations that is common to all the classification schemes.  In order that the
results are not unduly distorted by outliers, we exclude the cases of extremely rapid
exchange rate depreciation (defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as “freely falling”).





, where p is the percentage change in the
consumer price index since the previous year.  This is less than but very close to p for
small positive p, but tends to 100 as p tends to infinity, thus compressing differences at
the high end of the range.
When the four regime classification schemes that cover the full period are used, we have
a sample of 898 country-year observations from 73 countries over the period 1985-2001.
Table 2 reports the results of a regression of transformed inflation on a start-of-year hard-
peg dummy and a float dummy, two types of controls: year dummies only (panel A); and
year plus country dummies (panel B).  The hard-peg dummy compares average inflation
rates for hard pegs (which are similarly defined across all classifications) with those for
adjustable pegs (whose definition varies with the classification).  The regression allows
for a time trend in this coefficient, since inflation rates in regimes that are not hard pegs
have fallen markedly over the period.  The float dummy compares average inflation rates
for floats with those for adjustable pegs.
4  Year dummies are included to control for
global inflation fluctuations that affect all the countries in the sample.  Adding country
dummies may be regarded as a control for the effects of structural variables that are
strongly persistent over time but have significant cross-country variation (e.g. country
size, factor endowments, ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) without selecting an
explicit model.  This should produce similar results to an explicit model, without the
disadvantage of reducing the sample size because of problems of data availability.
                                                          
4 There is no evidence of a time trend in this coefficient, once a time-varying hard-peg effect is allowed for.9
Note first that the standard error of the regression is much smaller with country dummies,
which indicates marked variation in countries’ average inflation rates.  Inclusion of the
country dummies also makes estimation of the hard peg effect much less precise (the
standard error is many times as large) because so few countries have switched to or from
hard pegs.  The clear message from the table is that hard pegs have very significantly
lower inflation than other regimes, but that the difference has fallen over time as inflation
in other regimes has declined towards that in hard pegs.10
Table 2.  Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
IMF JS LYS RR BOR 













































Standard error 6.35 6.31 6.36 5.98 6.35



































Standard error 4.94 4.90 4.93 4.81 4.65
Sample size 898 898 898 898 904
No. of countries 73 73 73 73 92
Time period 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1990−2001
Notes.  The dependent variable is the transformed percentage change in the CPI since the
previous year [100p/(100+p), where p is the raw percentage change].  Observations with
p > 40 per cent p.a. are excluded.  The hard peg dummy is identical across classification
schemes.  Excluded category is soft peg.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-
robust t-statistics.  Time = zero in 1990. The identical sample is used for all but the BOR
classification.
The estimates without fixed country effects suggest that floats are characterised by
inflation about two percentage points higher than soft pegs, but for the RR classification
the estimate is six percentage points.  With fixed country effects (which confines the
sample for the purpose of estimating regime effects to countries that have switched
regime at least once), three classification schemes (IMF, LYS, BOR) estimate a
difference that is below one percentage point and statistically insignificant.  The JS and11
RR schemes continue to suggest that (transformed) inflation is higher under floating, by
2.4 and 4.4 percentage points respectively.
The details of classification algorithms are important here.  We have been careful to
classify crawling pegs and bands as pegs, on the grounds that these regimes target real,
even if not nominal, exchange rate stability, which is an important objective of a peg.
The JS classification is an exception in that its peg classification requires nominal
exchange rate stability, or at most one devaluation per calendar year.  This means that
crawling pegs would be defined as floats under the JS classification.
For the RR classification, the picture is complicated by the use of the parallel exchange
rate.   Since this classification effectively ignores the twenty per cent of months with the
largest exchange rate movements, it is challenging for an exchange rate to be classified as
a float using official rates, once countries with serious inflationary problems are
discarded.  Parallel rates are naturally more volatile, especially if the authorities are using
import controls to defend an official exchange rate that inflation has rendered
uncompetitive.  In this sample it is noticeable that (a) observations with inflation in the
25-40 per cent range are considerably more likely to be classified as RR floats than those
with inflation below 25 per cent, and (b) there is a correlation in the RR classification
between a country experiencing inflationary crises and the likelihood of it being
classified as floating in other years (see Table 3).  Thus there seems to be something in
the RR classification procedure that makes a float classification more likely in countries
with inflationary problems.  Indeed Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004, p. 8) claim that
“market-determined dual/parallel rates are important barometers of monetary policy”
seems to represent an acceptance that their classification is sensitive to the inflation rate.12
Table 3.  Classification of high-inflation observations
Inflation rate Countries with:









71 546 237 381
Classification
scheme
Proportion of observations classified as floats
IMF 0.69 0.59 0.67 0.56
JS 0.76 0.71 0.71 0.71
YS 0.45 0.46 0.33 0.53
RR 0.68 0.23 0.42 0.19
Notes.  Observations with inflation > 40 per cent p.a. are excluded.  The sample is the
898 observations used in the Table 2 regressions, with the 279 hard peg observations
excluded.
Given that the JS and RR schemes can be argued to be biased towards a finding that
floating is associated with higher inflation, and that the richer model that allows for
countries’ structural features shows no difference in inflation rates between floats and
soft pegs for the other schemes, the safest conclusion appears to be that there is no robust
evidence that soft pegs promote price stability.
6. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND GROWTH
In this section we look at how per capita growth varies across exchange rate regimes at
the end of the previous calendar year.  We exclude all observations where per capita
growth is outside the range -10 per cent to +15 per cent, as these observations are likely
to be associated with civil wars and other disturbances, or the immediate recovery from
them, and could seriously distort the results.  We also continue to exclude the inflationary
crisis observations with freely falling exchange rates, which are known to be associated
with slow growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).  We have a common sample of 877
observations for 73 countries over the period 1984-2001.13
Table 4. Per Capita Growth and Exchange Rate Regimes
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
IMF JS LYS RR BOR

































Standard error 3.55 3.55 3.54 3.52 3.51























Standard error 3.32 3.31 3.31 3.30 3.32
Sample size 877 877 877 877 882
No. of countries 73 73 73 73 92
Time period 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1990−2001
Notes.  The dependent variable is per capita GDP growth, with observations outside the
range –10 to +15 per cent excluded.  Observations with inflation > 40 per cent p.a. are
excluded.  The hard peg dummy is identical across classification schemes. Excluded
category is soft peg.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  The
identical sample is used for all but the BOR classification.
Table 4 shows the results, using the same controls as for inflation, but excluding the time
trend in the hard-peg dummy, which is insignificant in every case.  According to three
classifications (IMF, JS, BOR), floats and soft pegs have very similar growth rates.
According to the LYS classification, floats have the higher growth rates, by about 0.4 per
cent p.a., but the difference is not statistically significant, especially with fixed country
effects.  Although the LYS classification is the most favourable to floats, we have not
been able to reproduce the finding of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) that there is a14
statistically significant growth penalty for pegging.
5  The Reinhart-Rogoff classification,
on the other hand, suggests precisely the opposite conclusion, with growth rates a
statistically significant 1.1 per cent p.a. lower under floats.  Hard pegs also have lower
growth rates than soft pegs, but not significantly so with fixed country effects (which are
highly collinear with hard pegs because of the infrequency of switches between hard pegs
and other regimes).
The Reinhart-Rogoff classification thus seems to be something of an outlier in this
regression.  This may perhaps be related to Alesina and Wagner’s (2003) finding that
countries that claim to peg and actually float (according to RR) have poor institutional
quality relative to those that claim to float and are classified by RR as a peg.  It might be
that countries with highly depreciated parallel exchange rates grow more slowly and are
particularly likely to be classified as RR as a float.  We have investigated this by setting
up a dummy variable that takes the value one if the parallel exchange market values the
domestic currency at least one-third less (in terms of its purchasing power over foreign
currency) than the official market, and zero otherwise.  This dummy takes the value one
in 95 of the 877 observations in the common sample.  Unfortunately it does not help to
explain the differences between the results for RR and the other classification schemes.
The same is true if we separate out observations with inflation over 25 per cent p.a., or
countries which have had inflation over 40 per cent p.a. during the period.
A further way to investigate the discrepancies between the RR results and the rest is to
split the data according to whether the RR and IMF classifications are in agreement or
not.  In column (1) of Table 5, there are dummies for an IMF float combined with an RR
peg, for an IMF peg combined with an RR float, and for an IMF float combined with an
RR float.  The omitted category is a peg according to both classifications.  It is clear that
the lowest growth rates are associated with an IMF peg combined with an RR float.
These are most probably cases of monetary policy that is inconsistent with a peg, so that
                                                          
5 This is not because our standard error is larger (it is in fact somewhat smaller than in their Table 5), but
because their point estimate of the floating effect is more than twice as large as ours.  Relevant factors are
that they use data from 1970 to 1999, and they combine dirty floats and crawling pegs into an intermediate
category.15
the parallel rate is depreciating rapidly.  Nevertheless agreed floats seem to have growth
rates about one per cent less than agreed pegs.  Column (2) of Table 5 shows that very
little of these differences are explained by dummies for inflation above 25 per cent or for
highly depreciated parallel exchange rates.
Since the RR classification has a stringent definition of a float, RR floats will either be
genuine but relatively clean and high-volatility floats (e.g. South Africa) or rapid
depreciations of the parallel rate, often when the country is officially pegging (e.g.
Nigeria from 1994 to 1998).  The results suggest that these types of regime have lower
growth than the rest.


































Standard error 3.31 3.31
Sample size 877 877
No. of countries 73 73
Notes.  The dependent variable is per capita GDP growth, with observations outside the
range –10 to +15 per cent excluded, as are observations with inflation > 40 per cent p.a..
All regressors are indicator variables.  Year and country dummies are included in the
regression.  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Omitted category is soft peg in both
classifications.16
To summarise: it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the relationship between
exchange rate regimes and growth in developing countries because differences in growth
rates that are economically significant are often not statistically significant.  Four out of
five classifications show no significant differences, but the RR classification based on
parallel rates suggests that adjustable pegs have higher growth rates than floats, which is
perhaps not what one would expect, given the evidence, for example, that pegs suffer
greater output losses from negative terms-of-trade shocks (Broda, 2004).  The worst
growth outcomes appear to be associated with a monetary policy that is inconsistent with
an official peg.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Alternative schemes for classifying exchange rate regimes display a disappointing lack of
consistency, and disagree with each other as much as with the official classification.  This
is only partly a reflection of how stringent they choose to be in defining a peg or band.
Three out of four alternative schemes that use official exchange rates agree with the
official classification in suggesting that growth rates in developing countries are not
significantly different under soft pegs and floats.  According to the official and two
alternative classifications, inflation rates are also similar in these two regimes.  Hard
pegs, in which adjustment of the parity is inhibited either by legal barriers (currency
boards) or the need for the agreement of other countries (a common currency), are
associated with lower inflation than other regimes, although the difference has fallen in
recent years with the general decline in inflation rates in developing countries.  Hard pegs
are also associated with slower growth, by up to one per cent p.a., but there have been so
few switches to and from hard pegs that it is impossible to distinguish clearly between a
regime effect and fixed country effects.
The Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) scheme is unusual in that it is based on parallel exchange
rates, and also uses a definition of a peg that is so wide as to include acknowledged low-
volatility floats, such as Canada and Switzerland.  One effect of this, at least in a sample17
confined to developing countries, is a bias of the float classification towards countries
with significant inflationary problems and low institutional quality, as found by Alesina
and Wagner (2003).  Observations with inflation above 25 per cent, or in countries whose
inflation rate has exceeded 40 per cent in at least one other year, are much more likely to
be classified as a float than a peg in this classification.  Our finding of one per cent slower
growth for floats than soft pegs using this classification is markedly different to our
findings for the other classifications, and suggests that there is a particular growth penalty
for official pegs with inconsistent monetary policy, resulting in rapidly depreciating
parallel rates.
In summary, use of a common sample resolves some, but not all, of the discrepancies in
previous results.  For growth, the LYS scheme no longer suggests significantly higher
growth under floating, but the RR scheme continues to suggest significantly lower growth
for floats.  For inflation, the RR scheme is again an outlier.  The most probable
explanation for this is that parallel market data convey information about issues beyond
exchange rate policy (such as monetary and trade policy).  This needs to be taken into
account by the users of such a scheme.18
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